This short briefing examines UK government spending presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, in his Spring Budget 2023 (SB-23).1i
The detailed figures for SB-23 show that UK military spending over the period 2021-25 has been boosted by £7.1 billion when compared with budget figures announced in last autumn. This includes an extra £1.5bn for the financial year 2022-23, and an extra £5.6bn for the two-year period 2023-25. This increase is a 3.7% uplift, which is higher than for any other government department, including health and social care, education, levelling up and communities, environment and agriculture, transport, and foreign affairs and international development. The £7.1bn rise is also significantly higher than the headline figure of £5bn stated as part of the ‘Integrated Review Refresh’ (IRR) – an update of security and foreign policies launched to coincide with the budget. The Chancellor also announced a further £6bn increase spread over the three years 2025-28 – assuming the government wins the next general election. Hence the total increase in military spending announced in SB-23 is £13.1bn – not £11bn as widely reported.
The military spending boost comes on the back of a huge rise announced in 2020 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and further above-inflation increases in the interim period. The latest rationale behind these rises is provided in the IRR, which entrenches a more confrontational approach to global issues, especially in the wake of the war in Ukraine. The increased emphasis on military prowess comes, in particular, at the expense of spending on international development – which is again cut. There will also be little solace for striking workers in the health, education and other public sectors as an opportunity to significantly increase these budgets has been missed. Furthermore, efforts to tackle the climate crisis have been further undermined as no new funding for home energy conservation or renewable energy was announced – with preference given to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies. The increased focus on nuclear coincides with its greater emphasis in the military sector – especially as part of the new AUKUS submarine deal – which clearly indicates that civilian energy policy is being shaped by a wider agenda.
The latest figures on UK government spending2 show the following on military issues:
Table 1. Core military spending – comparison between figures in Spring Budget 2023 (SB-23) and Autumn Statement 2022 (AS-22)
| Core Military Spending in £bn | 2021-22 | 2022-23 | 2023-24 | 2024-25 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spring Budget 2023 | 45.9 | 53.1 | 50.9 | 51.7 | 201.6 |
| Autumn Statement 2022 | 45.9 | 51.6 | 48.4 | 48.6 | 194.5 |
| Difference | 0.0 | +1.5 | +2.5 | +3.1 | +7.1 |
The issue of climate spending is worth further comment, given the urgent need – both nationally and internationally – to rapidly reduce carbon emissions to reach the Paris Climate Agreement targets. In particular, the target to hold global temperature rise below 1.5C is quickly moving out of reach because of a lack of ambition of industrialised nations including the UK. The resulting impacts – both globally and on the UK – will be devastating. Hence, the government’s recent approval of major new fossil fuel extraction projects covering gas, oil and coal – driven by the British Energy Security Strategy12 – has been especially damaging. SB-23 was a missed opportunity to change direction. Disturbingly, for example, it did not seek to strengthen the windfall tax on the huge profits of the oil and gas industry. Neither did it offer extra support for home energy conservation and renewable energy technologies – despite their proven track record for reducing emissions and costs. Instead, the government focused on nuclear power – planned to be officially re-classified as ‘sustainable energy’ along with renewable technologies13 – and fossil fuel-based technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, despite their poor track record. This counter-intuitive approach has an explanation in the IRR. It strongly links the development of military and civilian nuclear industries.14 The agreement of the new AUKUS dea15 – which is planned to use British and US manufacturing facilities to help construct a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian military – is especially important in this context.
Dr Stuart Parkinson is Co-chair of GCOMS-UK and Executive Director of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR).
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