Ian Sinclair reveals how the mainstream media is downplaying US-British crimes in Iraq

Ian Sinclair

The Marines of 3rd Squad, 4th Platoon, Quick Reaction Force, Force Protection Company, II Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD), pose after conducting a security operation in August 2005.


“The chief problem in historical honesty is not outright lying, it is omission or de-emphasis of important data,” US historian Howard Zinn says in You Can’t Be Neutral on a Moving Train, the 2004 documentary about his life.

A good example of this truism is a recent episode of Witness History on the BBC World Service, with US Colonel Andrew Milburn recounting his time fighting in what BBC presenter Alex Last calls “the battle for Fallujah” in Iraq.

In the short radio piece — each segment of Witness History is just nine minutes long — Last provides some context for listeners: with the 2003 US-British invasion and subsequent occupation creating significant opposition, the city of Fallujah, in Iraq’s western province of Anbar, had become an insurgency stronghold.

In an attempt to subdue the resistance, the US undertook a huge assault on Fallujah in November 2004 — involving 20,000 troops backed by tanks and aircraft.

Last notes that, with a population of 250,000, there was estimated to be around 2,500 fighters in the city at the time of the attack, along with some 20-30,000 civilians.

“Honestly, it was rare that you saw civilians,” Milburn says about the urban warfare he experienced. “There was a kind of feeling: ‘Look, there aren’t civilians here, we have got tanks, we have got anti-tank weapons, let’s just use these instead of sending guys into buildings’.”

“That is when most of the destruction happened,” he remembers. “By the end of the battle [in December 2004] … it looked like the second world war. It looked like Dresden or Stalingrad.”

The US and Iraqi government forces lost around 100 killed and 500 wounded, notes Last, with “conservative estimates” of “hundreds of Iraqi civilians” killed.

“It was a pyrrhic victory,” Milburn concludes. “Even as we won the city and we killed thousands of the insurgents, there were many, many more being recruited — largely by pictures of us rubbling a city.”

As these quotes suggest, critical consumers can occasionally gleam some useful information from BBC reporting.

However, Witness History’s focus is on the US experience, with all the problems that comes with this.

Last’s assertion that 20-30,000 civilians were left in Fallujah is a very low estimate, with a statement at the time from the top US general in Iraq, George W Casey, suggesting the US military believed 60-100,000 civilians remained in the city at the beginning of the attack.

The essential 2017 book Media, Propaganda and the Politics of Intervention by Newcastle University’s Dr Florian Zollmann also calls into question the BBC’s estimate of civilian deaths.

After conducting a detailed analysis of media coverage of Fallujah, Zollmann suggests the total number of civilian dead was probably around 2,000.

For example, in January 2005 the director of the main hospital in Fallujah reported that there had been 700 bodies recovered from just one-third of the city, 550 of them women and children.

Moreover, the programme omitted any mention of arguably the most important aspect of the carnage — that US forces perpetrated what would be considered war crimes if they were carried out by official enemy states like Iran, Syria or Russia.

Indeed, in the introduction to his 2007 verbatim play Fallujah, academic and playwright Jonathan Holmes argues that the US contravened 70 individual articles of the Geneva conventions in Fallujah.

The scene was set for the slaughter by US Lt Col Gary Brandl, who led the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment into the fight with these words: “The enemy has got a face. He’s called Satan. He’s in Fallujah. And we’re going to destroy him.”

Media reports at the time noted the US military and their Iraqi allies cut off the city’s electricity and water supplies and, in an early operation, targeted Fallujah’s general hospital.

The hospital was “considered a refuge for insurgents and a centre of propaganda.” The New York Times reported that US special forces and Iraqi troops smashed in doors and patients and medical staff were “rushed out of rooms by armed soldiers and ordered to sit or lie on the floor while troops tied their hands behind their backs.”

Testifying at the 2008 Winter Soldier hearings, US marine Michael Leduc explained how the rules of engagement changed for Fallujah — “now, we were operating under the assumption that everyone was hostile.”

His battalion officer encouraged marines to kill anyone using a mobile phone and anyone they suspected of “manoeuvring against” them.

The US implemented “a strict night-time shoot-to-kill curfew,” The Times reported, with “anyone spotted in the soldiers’ night vision sights … shot.”

“Every weapon available in our arsenal short of nukes is turned on Fallujah,” US army Sergeant David Bellavia wrote in his memoir.

This included white phosphorus. A 2005 edition of the journal Field Artillery confirming its use in Fallujah by publishing testimony from a US officer: “We used it … as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents in trench lines and spider holes when we could not get effects on them with HE [high explosive].”

With the bloodbath in full swing, the US military blocked aid from reaching the city, with a convoy of food and medicine brought by the Iraqi Red Crescent refused entry, according to the Guardian.

Furthermore, the Associated Press reported that “hundreds of men trying to flee the assault on Fallujah have been turned back by US troops following orders to allow only women, children and the elderly to leave.”

Also unmentioned by Witness History is the key role played by British forces. British infantry battalion the Black Watch was redeployed from southern Iraq to the area surrounding Fallujah in order to replace US marines sent into the city.

“They have been used to block off insurgents running weapons into Baghdad and to plug escape routes for those fleeing the US assault on Fallujah,” a November 2004 BBC News article reported.

BBC World Service journalists may see themselves as part of an “impartial, accurate, trustworthy” news organisation, as a former World Service director once said.

However, in reality, BBC reporting, such as this episode of Witness History, often follows a propagandistic framing of Western foreign policy.

As Warwick University’s Professor Susan Carruthers noted in her 2000 book The Media At War, in wartime “the media have generally served the military rather well.”

Zollmann confirms that this maxim very much applies to Fallujah, with his study comparing the US offensive in the Iraqi city to human rights abuses in Kosovo (1999), Libya (2011), Syria (2012) and Egypt (2013).

His analysis shows how Fallujah was “framed in terms of reciprocal war and fighting” — remember the title of the Witness History episode: “The Battle for Fallujah.”

There was some critical media coverage, he notes, but this “was placed in an ideological context, which still assumed that ‘allied’ countries constitute legitimate and positive forces.”

This “politicised discourse” has huge ramifications, he argues, serving “to obscure the well-documented fact” that US actions in Fallujah “also shared the properties of massacres and war crimes.

“If countries designated to be ‘enemy’ states of the West conduct human rights violations, the news media highlights these abuses and conveys demands for action to stop human rights abuses” is Zollmann’s damning conclusion.

“If, on the other hand, Western states or their ‘allies’ are the perpetrators of human rights violations, the news media employs significantly less investigatory zeal in its reporting and virtually no measures to stop abuses are conveyed.”

With the BBC and the rest of the mainstream media downplaying US-British crimes, it falls to those concerned citizens who are aware of the real history of Fallujah to make sure this dark chapter in US-British foreign policy is never forgotten.

Source: Morning Star

05 Feb 2020 by Ian Sinclair